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LOUISIANA UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE-
AFTER TWENTY YEARS
W. Shelby McKenzie*
Prior to 1977, automobile liability insurance in Louisiana was not
compulsory. Proof of financial responsibility was required only after
the motorist had been involved in an accident. Many innocent acci-
dent victims, although insured against their own liability, were left
uncompensated because the negligent motorist was uninsured and not
financially responsible. Recognizing this serious gap in protection, the
legislature, in 1962, required insurers to make uninsured motorist (UM)
insurance protection available in certain minimal limits to persons pur-
chasing automobile liability insurance.' Through legislative and judicial
expansion, UM coverage has become a very significant protection for
insured Louisiana motorists and a fertile field for litigation. This arti-
cle reviews the current status of the statutory and jurisprudential




Uninsured motorist, coverage received its initial legislative endorse-
ment in Act 187 of 1962, which amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406 to add subsection (D). This act provided that no automobile
liability insurance policy would be issued or delivered in Louisiana
unless protection for persons insured thereunder was provided "in
not less than the limits described in the Motor Vehicle Safety Respon-
sibility Law" for bodily injury damages for which the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle is legally responsible. The
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law' required proof of ability to
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Loui-
siana Bar Association. This article is taken from a text on Louisiana insurance law
coauthored with H. Alston Johnson, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
The text is to be published in the near future. The author acknowledges the support
of the Section on Insurance, Negligence, Compensation, and Admiralty Law of the Loui-
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1. For a discussion of the public policy and industry considerations which gave
impetus to uninsured motorist coverage, see the opinion of Judge Minos Miller in
Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266
So. 2d 223 (1972). See also Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d
580 (1968).
2. For an excellent survey of the jurisprudence at an earlier stage of develop-
ment, see Lane, The Annotated Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 24 LA. B.J. 15 (1976).
3. LA. R.S. 32:851-1043 (Supp. 1952).
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respond in damages for liability in the amount of $5,000 for bodily
injury to one person, with a maximum of $10,000 for bodily injury
to two or more persons in any one accident.
The insured named in the policy was granted the option of reject-
ing uninsured motorist coverage.' The Act also provided that the in-
surer, to the extent of any payment, was entitled to reimbursement
out of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of the
insured's right of recovery against the person legally responsible for
the bodily injury.5
1964
Act 118 of 1964 provided that the coverage required under subsec-
tion 1406(D) could include provisions for submission of claims to ar-
bitration, but such submission would be at the option of the insured,
and such provisions would not deprive the courts of jurisdiction of
actions against the insurer.'
1970
Act 345 of 1970 amended 22:1406(D) to specify evidence which
would constitute prima facie proof that the owner and the operator
of the vehicle did not have liability insurance in effect on the date
of the accident.7
1972
Act 137 of 1972, which became effective January 1, 1973, made
two very significant extensions of uninsured motorist coverage. First,
although the Act continued to require only the minimal $5,000 to
$10,000 limits described in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Law, the insured became entitled to increase his uninsured motorist
coverage "to any amount not in excess of the limits of the automobile
liability insurance carried by such insured."8
Act 137 also introduced the concept of underinsured motorist pro-
tection by providing that the statutory definition of uninsured motor
vehicle would include "an insured motor vehicle when the automobile
4. See text at notes 17-26, infra (Mandatory Coverage).
5. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (Supp. 1962). See text at notes 154-161, infra (Subrogation
and the Right to Settle).
6. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(5). Compulsory arbitration provisions of preamendment
policies were held to be unenforceable. SpiUman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
179 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
7. LA. R.S. 22:1406(E)(6).
8. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b).
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liability insurance coverage on such vehicle [was] less than the unin-
sured motorist coverage carried by an insured."9
Act 550 of 1972 specified additional evidence which would con-
stitute prima facie proof of uninsured status."
1974
Act 154 of 1974 amended the liability limits of mandatory unin-
sured motorist coverage to require that the insurer provide coverage
"in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the
policy," unless the insured rejected the coverage or selected lower
limits. Act 154 also expanded underinsured motorist protection by pro-
viding that such coverage was available when automobile liability in-
surance coverage was "less than the amount of damages suffered by
the insured.""
1975
Act 494 of 1975 provided that mandatory uninsured motorist
coverage limits did not need to "be provided in or supplemental to
a renewal or substitute policy where the named insured [had] rejected
the coverage or selected lower limits in connection with a policy
previously issued to him by the same insurer." 2
Act 656 of 1975 further expanded the provision for prima facie
proof of uninsured status."
1977
Act 438 of 1977, with respect to the rejection of uninsured motorist
coverage or the selection of lower limits, provided that "any docu-
ment signed by the named insured or his legal representative which
initially rejects such coverage or selects lower limits shall be con-
clusively presumed to become a part of the policy or contract when
issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically attached
thereto."'"
Act 623 of 1977, which is known as the anti-stacking provision,
precluded stacking of coverages for multiple vehicles, except under
9. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b). For an application of this provision contrasted with the
1974 amendment of Act 154, see Doucet v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 302 So. 2d 731
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 305 So. 2d 134 (La. 1974).
10. LA. R.S. 22:1406(DX6).
11. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D2)(b).
12. LA. R.S. 22:1406(DX1)(a).
13. LA. R.S. 22:1406(DX6).
14. LA. R.S. 22:1406(DX1)(a). See text at notes 17-26, infra (Mandatory Coverage).
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limited circumstances when the injured party was not occupying an
automobile owned by him.1
5
Act 623 also provided that an insurer would have to permit its
insured to increase uninsured motorist coverage "to any amount," thus
eliminating the the 1972 Act's limitation on UM coverage to the
amount of the automobile liability coverage. 6
Another 1977 act which was not incorporated into the UM statute
affects uninsured motorist claims. Act 444, which became effective
July 1, 1978, as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5629, provides a two-
year prescription on claims under uninsured motorist coverages.
MANDATORY COVERAGE
Insured
The UM statute provides that "no automobile liability insurance"
shall be issued without uninsured and underinsured motorist
protection.17 The courts have interpreted this requirement to mean
that UM coverage must be provided to the same persons who are
insured under the automobile liability coverage. If liability coverage
is not extended to a particular person, the statute does not require
UM coverage for such person." The statute is applicable to any
15. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(c). See text at notes 135-153, infra (Stacking of Multiple
Coverages).
16. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b).
17. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a) provides in part:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not
less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under the
provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; ...
18. Robertson v. Cumis Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 1371 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
357 So. 2d 1153 (La. 1978) (policy excluded liability coverage for a relative who owned
a private passenger automobile; thus no UM coverage was required for such relative);
Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 321 So. 2d 808 (La. App 4th Cir. 1975) (court remanded
for a determination of whether the employer's policy provided liability coverage for
an employee who was using his personal automobile in the course of employment;
if so, such policy also must provide UM coverage). In Meyers v. Gulf Ins. Co., 413
So.' 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff, a school board employee, allegedly
was injured while riding as a passenger on a school bus because of the negligence
of the bus driver. The liability claim against the insurer of the bus was dismissed
on a motion for summary judgment, based upon the cross-employee exclusion. The
court also dismissed the UM claim because the liability coverage was not applicable
to the plaintiff. This analysis is incorrect.,The cross-employee exclusion precluded liabili-
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automobile liability policy "delivered or issued for delivery in this state
with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state."'9 UM coverage is mandated for such policies whether'
issued by authorized or surplus line insurers.0 However, self-insured
companies are not required to provide UM protection. 1
The statute makes no distinction between primary and excess
automobile liability insurance. Presumably, UM coverage would be
mandated in an automobile liability policy which provides coverage
in excess of a primary policy or a self-insured retained limit.' Southern
American Insurance Co. v. Dobson,23 however, held that a commercial
umbrella liability policy and a commercial umbrella excess policy were
not automobile, liability insurance within the meaning of the statute,
because the statute was not directed toward policies which provide
a "broad spectrum" of liability coverages in excess of underlying in-
surance. Therefore, the court held that UM coverage was not man-
dated in such policies. The supreme court has granted writs to review
this decision."
Most automobile policies limit all coverages to, losses which occur
in the United States, its territories and possessions, and Canada. In
Curtis v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2" the plaintiffs were injured in an
automobile accident in Mexico. By the terms of the policy, neither
the liability coverage nor the UM coverage was applicable in Mexico.
In denying the UM claims, the federal district court upheld the ter-
ritorial limitations of the policy against the challenge that it was in-
consistent with the mandatory coverage required by statute. The UM
statute would appear to mandate coverage only within the territorial
limits of the liability coverage. 6
ty coverage for the bus driver-not the passenger. Under the jurisprudential test,
the UM issue should be whether the passenger was a liability insured (as a permissive
user). If so, UM coverage must be provided. The result in Meyers is correct because
the bus driver was not legally liable to the plaintiff because of the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.g., Gray v. Margot Inc., 408
So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
19. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
20. Veal v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 325 So. 2d 795 (La. 1975).
21. Jordan v. Honea, 407 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
22. See id.
23. 415 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
24. 420 So. 2d 439 (La. 1982).
25. 473 F. Supp 315 (E.D. La. 1979).
26. It might be argued from decisions such as Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), that the insured should be covered anytime, anywhere. However,
there is nothing in LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) to suggest mandatory territorial limits beyond
the limits provided for liability coverage. Such geographic restriction is reasonable
since the insurer should not be required to defend the issues of liability and coverage
for the allegedly negligent motorist arising anywhere in the world.
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Amount of Coverage
The original 1962 Act required liability limits of only $5,000 for
any one person and $10,000 for any one accident. 7 In 1972, the man-
datory minimum coverage remained the same, but the insured was
given the right to increase his UM coverage to any amount not in
excess of the limits of his automobile liability insurance." In 1974,
the insurer was required to issue UM coverage in amounts "not less
than" the limits of the bodily injury liability coverage. 9 In 1977, the
insured was given the right to increase his UM coverage to any
amount."
Rejection and Selection of Lower Limits
The original 1962 Act" permitted the insured named in the policy
to reject UM coverage. When the mandatory limits were increased,
the insured was given the option of selecting lower limits. 2 In 1975,
the statute was amended to provide that such coverage was not re-
quired in "a renewal or substitute policy where the named insured
had rejected the coverage or selected lower limits in connection with
a policy previously issued to him by the insurer.""3 Finally, Act 438
of 1977, effective September 9, 1977, provided that "any document
signed by the named insured or his legal representative" to that ef-
fect would be "conclusively presumed" to become part of the policy,
whether or not physically attached to the policy.'
Prior to Act 438 of 1977, the statute did not specify the form
or procedure required for effective rejection or selection of lower
limits. This omission spawned much litigation," and the 'matter was
resolved by the Louisiana Supreme Court in A.I.U. Insurance Co. v.
Roberts.' The insured, in January of 1975, purchased automobile liabili-
27. 1962 La. Acts, No. 187, adding LA. R.S. 22:1406(D). Cf. LA. R.S. 32:851 (Supp.
1952). See text at note 3, supra.
28. 1972 La. Acts, No. 137, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406.
29. 1974 La. Acts, No. 154, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
30. 1977 La. Acts, No. 623, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(b).
31. 1962 La. Acts, No. 187, adding LA. R.S. 22:1406(D).
32. 1972 La. Acts, No. 137, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) & (2).
33. 1975 La. Acts, No. 494, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
34. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
35. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Masura, 404 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1981); Collins v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 402 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981);
Ewing v. Sanson, 394 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); LeBoyd v. Louisiana Transit
Co., 375 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Breaux v. Government Emp. Ins. Co.,
373 So. 2d 1335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Turner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 797
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Walker v. Coleman, 367 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979);
Meyers v. Thibeaux, 365 'So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
36. 404 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981).
[Vol. 43
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
ty insurance with bodily injury limits of $25,000 per person, but he
orally selected UM limits of only $5,000 per person. Prior to the plain-
tiff's accident on July 13, 1978, the policy was renewed (on June 6,
1978). Since the plaintiffs bodily injury damages exceeded the pur-
ported UM limits of $5,000, the issue was whether the oral selection
of lower limits in January of 1975, was effective through subsequent
renewals of the policy. Since the UM statute did not specify the form
for rejection or selection of lower limits prior to Act 438 of 1977, the
supreme court concluded that for any selection of lower limits, the
formality requirements would be determined by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:628. This statute provides that any agreement modifying
a contract of insurance must be in writing and attached to the policy.
Since the UM statute should be treated as part of the policy, the
court reasoned that rejection of coverage or selection of lower limits
was a modification of the policy which had to meet the formality re-
quirements of 22:628. Thus, the oral selection of limits in 1975 was
not effective, and the plaintiff in Roberts was entitled to the coverage
mandated by statute.
Therefore, an effective rejection of coverage or selection of lower
limits prior to September 9, 1977, must be in writing and attached
to the policy in accordance with 22:628. Subsequent to that date,
22:1406(D)(1)(a) requires a document signed by the named insured or
his legal representative, but it does not require attachment of the
document to the policy.. Once the insured has effectively rejected or
reduced coverage, the mandatory coverage is not applicable to a
renewal or substitute policy issued to the same insured." The effect
of an unattached written waiver signed prior to the effective date
of the 1977 Act with respect to a renewal of the policy after the act's
effective date has not been resolved. 8
The statute provides that "any insured named in the policy" may
reject UM coverage or may select lower limits. A wife has been held
to have the authority to reject UM coverage under a policy issued
to her husband, where the policy defined the named insured to in-
clude "his spouse, if a resident of the same household."39 Likewise,
a rejection executed by an authorized corporate officer has been
effective."0
A waiver of UM coverage can be executed subsequent to issuance
37. 1975 La. Acts, No. 494, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
38. The approach of the supreme court to the issue in A.I.U. Ins. Co. v. Roberts,
404 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981), implies that prior waivers would be effective. But see Collins
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 402 So. 2d 158 (La. App 1st Cir. 1981).
39. Oncale v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 417 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). See
Rushing v. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 315 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
Soileau v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 182 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
40. Johnson v. Ortego, 408 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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of the policy," but a waiver cannot be made retroactive to the pre-
judice of insureds whose cause of action arose prior to the waiver's
execution.'
ELEMENTS OF COVERAGE
The risk insured against under uninsured motorist coverage is
generally defined in insurance policies as follows:
The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because
of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
highway vehicle.'
Each key element of the insuring agreement will be analyzed separate-
ly below.
Insured
For uninsured motorist coverage, the term insured is generally
defined to mean:
(a) the named insured and any relative;
(b) any other person while occupying an insured automobile; and
(c) any person, with respect to the damages he is entitled to
recover because of bodily injury sustained by an insured under
(a) or (b) above.
Named Insured and Relative
The named insured includes the person named in the declarations
of the policy and also his or her spouse, if the spouse is a resident
of the same household. A relative is usually defined as a relative of
the named insured who is a resident of the same household. Therefore,
with respect to both the spouse and the relative, there may be an
issue of residency. This issue has generated considerable litigation."
41. Cooper v. Barnes, 408 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
42. Id.; International v. Masur, 404 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
43. The policy provisions quoted in this article are taken from a policy form of
The Travelers Insurance Company. The Travelers' policy is representative of forms
in use in Louisiana, but there are variations among companies which may be signifi-
cant in a particular case. Also, a new generation of policies is now used by some com-
panies, occasionally referred to as "simplified" forms; these policies seek to restate
the coverage in more understandable terms. Time will tell whether litigation will be
necessary to "clarify" the simplified forms.
44. The issue of residency also arises under the liability and other coverages of
a family automobile policy and under homeowner's policies. See, e.g., Bond v. Commer-
[Vol. 43
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It is extremely important to note that there is generally no re-
quirement that the named insured or the relative be occupying an
automobile or any particular automobile at the time of the accident.
Thus, they are protected while riding in the insured automobile or
other automobiles, or when they are pedestrians or when they are
otherwise exposed to bodily injury as a result of the fault of the owner
or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle."5
Other Persons-Occupying
However, other persons are covered only while occupying an in-
sured automobile. Policies generally broaden the dictionary definition
of occupying to include persons "in or upon or entering into or alighting
from" the vehicle. Smith v. Girley8 contains the only supreme court
interpretation of- the definition of occupying in an UM policy. The plain-
tiff was a deputy sheriff who was attempting to start a stalled vehi-
cle by attaching battery cables between the stalled vehicle and the
sheriffs auto. After first attaching the battery cables to the stalled
vehicle, the plaintiff was reaching to attach the cables to the sheriff's
auto when the stalled vehicle was struck from the rear by a negligent
uninsured motorist. UM coverage under the policy issued on the
sheriff's auto was applicable to the deputy only if he were "occupy-
ing" the sheriff's car at the time of the accident.
Although the first circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
he was an "occupant" of the insured car, the supreme court found
as a fact that the plaintiff was in physical contact with the sheriff's
auto and therefore "upon" the vehicle at the time of the accident.
In dicta, the supreme court also approved of Hendricks v. American
Employees Insurance Co., 7 a court of appeal decision, and decisions
from other jurisdictions allowing recovery to persons in close prox-
imity to vehicles, even though they were not in actual physical con-
tact with the insured automobile.
The sphere of occupancy was further delineated by the first cir-
cuit in Breard v. Haynes.8 The plaintiff had been an occupant of a
cial Union Assur. Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 248 La. 246, 178 So. 2d 238 (1965); Earl v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So.
2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Hobbs v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d
28 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Ehrhard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 So. 2d
911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Dunn v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 229 So. 2d 465 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969).
45. See Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912, 918 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused,
262 La. 1096, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972).
46. 260 La. 223, 255 So. 2d 748 (1971), rev'g & affg 242 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 1st Cir.).
47. 176 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
48. 394 So. 2d 1282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). See also Day v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 420 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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vehicle struck in a rear end collision. Ten to fifteen minutes after
that accident, the plaintiff, while standing approximately seventy feet
from the vehicle in which he had been riding, was struck by an unin-
sured highway vehicle. Plaintiff recovered the full policy limits of UM
coverage on his own vehicle, even though his vehicle was not involved
in either accident. For the named insured under that policy, occupan-
cy of a vehicle was not a requirement of coverage. However, plaintiff
also sought to recover under the UM coverage of the vehicle which
he had been occupying at the time of the first collision. The court
concluded that the plaintiff was no longer occupying that vehicle at
the time of the second accident. While physical contact is not essen-
tial, the court interpreted the dicta in Smith v. Girley to require "some
physical relationship" between the person and the vehicle, concluding
that plaintiff's distance in time and space from the insured automobile
at the time of the second accident had severed any such physical rela-
tionship. The court also rejected a contention that the requirement
of occupancy was in contravention of the public policy favoring unin-
sured motorist coverage, as expressed in 22:1406(D).
Insured Automobile
The definition of an insured automobile generally includes the
automobile described in the declarations, a replacement automobile,
and a temporary substitute automobile. 5 Some policies also define an
insured automobile as a nonowned automobile while being operated
by the named insured.' The insured automobile also includes a trailer
attached to a vehicle described as an insured automobile. However,
policies generally exclude an automobile or trailer owned by a resi-
dent of the same household as the named insured, an automobile while
•49. In Box v. Doe, 221 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), a couple was struck
by a hit-and-run driver while the man was standing on the sidewalk unlocking the
door of the insured car. The woman was on the sidewalk waiting for the door to be
opened and not touching the car. The man, but not the woman, was found to be occupy-
ing the insured vehicle. The court found that there was "no evidence that she was
doing any act which could be remotely considered as entering [the insured vehicle]."
Id. at 671. However, standing in close proximity to the car while waiting for the door
to be unlocked may be occupancy within the expanded Smith test.
50. Policies generally define insured automobile as follows:
(a) An automobile described in ... the declarations for which a specific premium
charge indicates that coverage is afforded;
(b) A private passenger or utility automobile, ownership of which is acquired
by the named insured during the policy period, provided . . .
(c) A temporary substitute automobile for an insured automobile as defined in
(a) or (b) above; and
(d) A non-owned automobile while being operated by the named insured.
See note 43, supra.
51. See (d) in the definition of the insured automobile quoted in note 50, supra.
Cf. Phillips v. Barraza, 349 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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used as public or livery conveyance, and any automobile being used
without the permission of the owner.52
Uninsured Highway Vehicle
For UM coverage to exist, the insured must be entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle, and the
accident must arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the
uninsured highway vehicle.3 Policies generally provide that an unin-
sured highway vehicle includes both a vehicle without applicable liabili-
ty insurance coverage and a vehicle insured by a company which has
denied coverage or become insolvent.' The insolvency protection is
required by 27:1406(D)(3), but it is required only for a period of one
year. 5 More restrictive policy definitions are modified by
22:1406(D)(2)(b), which extends the definition of an uninsured highway
vehicle to include "an insured motor vehicle when the automobile liabili-
ty insurance coverage on such vehicle is less than the amount of
52. Policies often exclude from the definition of an insured automobile: "(1) any
automobile or trailer owned by a resident of the same household as the named in-
sured, (2) any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance or (3) any
automobile while being used without the permission of the owner." See text at notes
112-125, infra (Exclusions). For a definition of public or livery conveyance, see Gagnard
v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). Phillips v. Barraza, 349 So.
2d 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), upheld an exclusion from the definition of insured
automobile for "an automobile furnished for the regular use of the principal named
insured or any resident of the same household" against the challenge that it conflicted
with the UM statute.
53. Some policies use the term uninsured motor vehicle instead of uninsured highway
vehicle. A highway vehicle is usually defined as "a land motor vehicle or trailer other
than (1) a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally off public
roads, while not upon public roads or (2) a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads."
LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a) mandates coverage with respect to "insured and underinsured
motor vehicles" without any express limitation to highway vehicles. Posey v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), suggests that the protec-
tion required by statute may be broader than the policy definition of highway vehicle.
For a discussion on the requirement that the insured be "entitled to recover,"
see text at notes 88-97, infra (Legally Entitled to Recover).
54. The definition of uninsured highway vehicle often includes
a trailer of any type and means: (a) a highway vehicle with respect to the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of which there is .... no bodily injury liability bond
or insurance applicable at the time of the accident . . ., or with respect to which
there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time
of the accident, but the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder,
or is or becomes insolvent, or (b) hit-and-run vehicle; . . ..
See note 43, supra.
55. More favorable terms are permitted. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D3). However, the limita-
tion to one year is enforceable. DiPaola v. Fernandez, 270 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th




damages suffered by an insured.""6 Thus the definition includes both
uninsured and underinsured vehicles.
Hit-and-Run Vehicles
Most policies extend the definition of an uninsured highway vehi-
cle to include a hit-and-run vehicle. A hit-and-run vehicle is defined
as "a highway vehicle that causes bodily injury to the insured arising
out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with the
automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of the acci-
dent" when the identity of neither the operator nor the owner of such
vehicle can be ascertained. There also may be policy requirements
of notification to police authorities and notice of claim to the insurer
within specified times.57
The physical contact requirement in the policy definition of a hit-
and-run vehicle has been upheld. In Collins v. New Orleans Public Ser-
vice, Inc.,8 the injured plaintiff was a passenger on a public bus who
was injured when the driver of the bus was forced to stop suddenly
in order to avoid another vehicle which pulled in front of the bus.
The other vehicle continued on, and the identity of its owner and
driver could not be determined. The plaintiff brought suit against her
own UM carrier, alleging that a cause of the accident was the
negligence of the unidentified driver of the car. The insurer filed a
motion for summary judgment contending that its UM coverage was
inapplicable because there was no physical contact between the bus
and the automobile which caused the accident.
The plaintiff contended that there was no provision in the UM
statute requiring physical contact and, therefore, the policy require-
ment was in conflict with the mandatory coverage. The court rejected
this contention, finding that the hit-and-run coverage was an exten-
sion of coverage beyond that mandated by the statute. The insured
bears the burden of proof to establish every fact essential to a cause
of action under the policy coverage. One essential element is proof
56. Many companies attach an endorsement which expressly incorporates underin-
sured motorist protection. For a discussion of such endorsement, see Nall v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 216, 220 (La. 1981).
57. Many policies require that
the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within 24
hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
and shall have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under
oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of action
arising out of such accident for damages against a person or persons whose iden-
tity is unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support thereof.
See note 43, supra.
58. 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 375, 236 So. 2d 503 (1970).
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that the negligent motorist was uninsured." When the owner and
driver of the adverse vehicle cannot be identified, the insured is unable
to prove lack of insurance. Therefore, the inclusion of coverage for
a hit-and-run vehicle allows recovery under circumstances in which
the insured otherwise could not carry the burden of proof, and the
insurer may impose the physical contact requirement on this volun-
tary extension of coverage.
In Oliver v. Jones," the plaintiff was seriously injured when his
vehicle collided head-on with the defendant's vehicle, which had
swerved from the opposite lane to avoid a left-turning green truck.
The court of appeal affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs UM carrier, finding that the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of the driver of the unidentified green truck and there
was no physical contact between either the plaintiffs or the defen-
dant's vehicle and the green truck. The supreme court granted writs
and affirmed with a per curiam opinion observing that the result was
correct."
The physical contact requirement may be satisfied without actual
contact between the insured and the unidentified vehicle. In Springer
v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,62 the defendant's vehicle was
struck by an unidentified automobile, causing the defendant to lose
control of his vehicle, cross the neutral ground, and collide with the
insureds. There was physical contact between the defendant's vehicle
and the hit-and-run vehicle, but the insureds collided only with the
defendant. In Ray v. DeMaggio,' the insureds were involved in ,a chain
reaction rear-end collision involving four vehicles. The insureds were
occupants of the lead car. A hit-and-run driver allegedly rear-ended
the third car, propelled it into the second, which in turn collided with
the insureds' vehicle.
In both Springer and Ray, the fourth circuit concluded that the
collision with another vehicle involved in the same accident was suffi-
cient to satisfy the physical contact requirement. In Springer, the court
noted that for the collision with the intermediate vehicle to satisfy
the requirement, "the injury causing impact must have a complete,
59. See text at notes 178-183, infra (Burden of Proof).
60. 370 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 376 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1979).
61. See also Carter v. Leonard, 413 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Gex v.
Doe, 391 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Hensley v. Government Emp. Ins. Co.,
340 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Tyler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 290
So. 2d 388 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); April v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d
50 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966).
62. 311 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
63. 313 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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proximate, direct and timely relationship with the first impact; the
impact must be the result of an unbroken chain of events with a clearly
definable beginning and ending, occurring in a continuous sequence.""
On rehearing in Springer, in answer to the argument that Springer
was inconsistent with Collins,5 the court pointed out that Collins was
a "miss-and-run" case. Exclusion of miss-and-run cases from UM
coverage, the court noted, is justifiable because such cases would be
"too fraud-fraught." However, if the physical contact requirement were
read too restrictively, the court argued, even the clothes on the in-
sured struck by a hit-and-run vehicle would preclude coverage."6
As illustrated by Arceneaux v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co.,7 proof
of hit-and-run alone may not be sufficient to justify UM recovery, since
policies require also that the identity of the owner or operator "can-
not be ascertained." Although the insured's vehicle was'struck and
forced off the road by an automobile which did not stop, independent
witnesses furnished sufficient evidence, contained in the police report,
to identify the owner and operator of the vehicle. Since the identity
could be ascertained, the court concluded that the accident was not
caused by a "hit-and-run automobile."68
Failure to comply strictly with the notice requirements of hit-and-
run coverage may not be fatal to the insured's claim. For example,
in Kinchen v. Dixie Auto Insurance Co., 9 the insured did not file a
sworn statement of claim within 30 days of the accident. The insurer
asserted this notice breach as a defense. In denying this defense, the
court pointed to the general jurisprudential rule that breach of a notice
provision is not a defense unless the insurer can prove actual pre-
judice resulting from the delay."
Exclusion of the Insured Vehicle
The policy definition of an uninsured highway vehicle generally
contains an express exclusion for "an insured automobile." This policy
64. 311 So. 2d at 36.
65. 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 375, 236 So. 2d 503 (1970).
66. Cases dealing with the adequacy of the proof of physical contact include Yopp
v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 293 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) and Shelton
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
67. 341 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
68. In Powell v. Hendon, 308 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), the court found
the requirement that the identity of the motorist could not be ascertained was satisfied
by proof that the driver of the vehicle gave a fictitious name and could not be located.
On the other hand, in Frazier v. Jackson, 231 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970),
the court found that the requirement had not been satisfied where the identity of
the owner-driver who fled the scene could be determined through car registration.
69. 343 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
70. See text at notes 173-175, infra (Notice).
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exclusion has been upheld against the challenge that it contravenes
the uninsured and underinsured coverage mandated by 22:1406(D). This
exclusion is best illustrated by example. Suppose the plaintiff, a guest
passenger in the insured automobile, was injured solely as a result
of the negligence of his host driver, and suppose also that the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover damages for bodily injury in excess of the
liability limits available on the insured automobile, thus leaving the
host driver an underinsured motorist. Unless the insured automobile
was validly excluded from the definition of an uninsured highway vehi-
cle, the injured guest passenger would be entitled to recover any
damages in excess of the liability limits from the UM limits of the
same policy on the host vehicle. The issue of whether a claimant could
recover under both the liability and UM provisions of the same policy
was first presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Breaux v.
Government Employees Insurance Co.," under more complex factual
circumstances than the hypothetical case. The plaintiffs were the sur-
vivors of a passenger in the insured vehicle who was killed in an ac-
cident caused by the negligence of the operator of that vehicle. The
plaintiffs entered into a settlement with GEICO, the insurer of the
host driver's vehicle, for the amount representing GEICO's share of
the liability limits. However, the settlement contained an express
release of all claims against GEICO under both the liability and the
UM provisions of its policy."2 Since the value of their claim exceeded
the amount of the settlement, the plaintiffs sought to recover the re-
mainder of their damages from Traders, their own UM carrier. Traders
denied responsibility on the ground that GEICO would have provided
the primary UM coverage had it not been released by the plaintiffs.73
Therefore, Traders claimed that it was entitled to credit for the
amount of GEICO's UM coverage, which coverage would have been
sufficient to fully compensate the plaintiffs without resort to Traders'
excess policy."'
The First Circuit Court of Appeal7" agreed with Traders, thus in-
directly holding that the claimant could have recovered under both
71. 369 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1979).
72. The liability limits were $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. The
policy afforded UM coverage with the same limits. Since there were multiple injuries
and deaths, the full liability limits were not available to the plaintiffs, who settled
for $39,700.00. The trial court concluded that their total damages were $76,904.65, leaving
a claim of $37,204.65 in excess of the liability limits. Id. at 1336-37.
73. The "other insurance" clauses of UM coverage generally provide that the
coverage is excess when the insured is occupying a nonowned automobile covered by
similar insurance. See note 137, infra.
74. Traders contended that the plaintiffs would have been entitled to the same
proportion of the UM limits as the liability limits, $39,700.00. See note 72, supra.
75. 364 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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the liability and UM provisions of the same policy for damages caused
b~y the negligence of the host driver. The court followed the logic
of the third circuit in Guillot v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,"8 where the
court held that the policy provisions designed to prevent such multi-
ple recovery were invalid, in derogation of the coverage mandated
by statute.
A unanimous supreme court reversed,77 concluding that the statute
implicitly distinguished between an "insured vehicle" and an "unin-
sured vehicle" and did not contemplate that a single vehicle could
be both the insured and the uninsured vehicle. Thus the statute does
not require that the insured automobile be considered an uninsured
(underinsured) automobile after exhaustion of the liability coverage
for negligence of the host driver. Therefore, policy provisions which
exclude the insured automobile from the definition of uninsured motor
vehicle are enforceable. Since the GEICO UM coverage was not
available to the plaintiffs, Traders was liable under its UM coverage
for the plaintiffs' damages in excess of GEICO's liability coverage up
to the limits of Traders' policy. Although this decision worked to the
benefit of the plaintiffs in Breaux, the net effect of the decision is
to restrict the amount of UM coverage available to guest passengers.
The supreme court again considered this issue in Nall v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."8 A guest passenger, injured
solely as a result of the negligence of his host driver, sought to recover
both liability and underinsured motorist benefits under the policy on
the host vehicle. The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the Breaux
conclusion that the UM statute does not mandate UM coverage for
the insured vehicle." There were, however, two dissents suggesting
that Breaux should be overruled.
In Breaux and Nall, the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of the host driver. In Breaux, the supreme court suggested
in a footnote that a guest passenger might be able to recover under
both the liability and UM coverages on the host vehicle if the host
driver were jointly liable with another driver who was uninsured or
underinsured. 0 This issue was presented in Casson v. Dairyland In-
surance Co.,81 in which a serious accident was caused by the joint
negligence of two drivers, each auto being insured with liability and
UM limits of $5,000 per person and $10,000 per accident. At issue
76. 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
77. 369 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1979).
78. 406 So. 2d 216 (La. 1981).
79. See also Shipp v. State Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982); Coco v. Allstate Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
80. 369 So. 2d at 1338 n.5.
81. 400 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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was the coverage available to a guest passenger in one vehicle and
three guest passengers in the other vehicle, all with substantial claims.
With respect to the policy on the host vehicle, the third circuit
concluded that a guest passenger could recover under the liability
coverage based upon the negligence of the host driver and under the
UM coverage based upon the negligence and inadequate coverage of
the other driver."2 Since both drivers were liable in solido to all four
claimants, the combined liability limits of $20,000 were apportioned
among the claimants. The single guest passenger was entitled to the
$5,000 UM limits on that vehicle, and the other three guest passengers
shared the $10,000 UM limits on the vehicle they were occupying.
These UM claims were based upon the negligence and inadequate
coverage of the other driver-not the negligence and inadequate
coverage of the host driver.
Other Excluded Vehicles
Generally, the policy definition of an uninsured highway vehicle
also excludes: (a) an automobile furnished or available for the regular
use of the named insured or a relative, (b) a vehicle owned or operated
by a qualified self-insurer, (c) a vehicle owned by any federal, state,
or local government, and (d) a vehicle (which includes a trailer) while
located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vehicle. Other
than the implied distinction between the insured vehicle and the unin-
sured vehicle recognized in Breaux and Nall,8" the UM statute does
not place any limitations on the definition of an uninsured highway
vehicle. Therefore, it is unlikely that a more restrictive policy defini-
tion will be given effect. Indeed, the exclusion of an auto furnished
or available to the named insured or a relative84 has been held to
82. Nal held that LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) "contemplates two distinct motor vehicles:
the motor vehicle with respect to which uninsured motorist coverage is issued and
the 'uninsured or underinsured' motor vehicle." 406 So. 2d at 220; accord Breaux, 369
So. 2d at 1338. Unlike the facts in Breaux and Nall, two distinct motor vehicles ex-
isted in Casson. In an attempt to prevent recovery under both liability and uninsured
motorist coverage, some policies provide that payment under one coverage shall be
credited against the limits of liability under the other coverage. Although such a credit
provision was not discussed in Casson, courts generally have found other reduction
of coverage provisions to be contrary to the mandated UM coverage. See, e.g., Smith
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Williams v. Buckelew,
246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); cf. Hebert v. Green, 311 So. 2d 223 (La. 1975).
See text at notes 126-134, infra (Reduction Clauses).
83. See text at notes 71-82, supra (Exclusions of the Insured Vehicle).
84. See text at notes 112-125, infra (Exclusions). This exclusion is analogous in
purpose and effect to the general exclusion of coverage to an insured while occupying
a highway vehicle (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured
or a relative or through being struck by such an automobile. Both of these exclusions
are designed to protect the insurer against the possibility that its insureds will not
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be in conflict with the UM statute and unenforceable. 5 In addition,
the exclusion for self-insurers may have no practical effect since very
few companies are totally self-insured," and in Powell v. Allstate In-
surance Co.,87 the exclusion for a vehicle owned by a local govern-
ment was held to be ineffective. However, the exclusion of a vehicle
used as a residence may be effective when the vehicle should no longer
be considered a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the UM statute.
Legally Entitled To Recover
The UM statute mandates coverage only for the damages which
the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator
of an uninsured or underinsured vehicle. In Booth v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co.,8" the supreme court interpreted this requirement to
mean only that the "plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the
part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove
the extent of those damages."8 The courts have permitted UM
claims in cases wh'ere the insured would not be able to maintain an
action against the negligent motorist. In Booth, the claim against the
negligent motorist was barred by prescription. However, since a longer
prescriptive period' applied to UM claims, the insurer was held liable.
In Gremillion v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., ' a wife claimed
UM coverage for bodily injury resulting from her husband's negligent
operation of an uninsured motorcycle. Rejecting the insurer's defense
that the wife could not maintain an action against her husband, the
court held that a personal defense such as interspousal immunity does
not prevent the recovery under UM coverage. 2
On the other hand, courts have rejected UM claims based upon
purchase insurance on each vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of such
insureds or relatives who are members of their household. Through restrictive defini-
tions of owned and nonowned automobiles, the insurer effectively protects against pro-
viding liability insurance for such vehicles.
85. See, e.g., cases cited in note 113, infra.
86. By asserting its subrogation rights in a third party demand, the UM insurer
should be able to protect itself from any loss, even if the exclusion was held invalid.
87. 233 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
88. 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968).
89. 253 La. at 530, 218 So. 2d at 583.
90. See text at notes 184-193, infra (Prescription).
91. 302 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
92. The court relied on Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So.
2d 259 (La. 1971), in which the court disallowed personal immunity as a defense in
a direct action against a liability insurer. Although the court refused to permit the
insurer to assert interspousal immunity to the wife's action in Gremillion, it permit-
ted the husband to assert interspousal immunity to the subrogation claim of the in-
surer. This appears to be an inconsistent application of the concept of "personal" defense.
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the negligence of a co-employee. 3 As a result of the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act,94 an employee does not
have a cause of action against a fellow employee. This tort immunity
is distinguished from personal defenses, such as interspousal immuni-
ty, which merely bar a right of action. 5
When contributory negligence was a defense to tort liability, it
likewise precluded recovery under UM coverage." Since the effective
date of the comparative negligence statute,97 there have been no
reported decisions applying the statute to UM coverage. However,
comparative negligence should be applicable to the determination of
both legal liability and the extent of recoverable damages.
Bodily Injury Damages
The UM statute limits recovery to damages resulting from bodily
injury. There is no coverage for-property damage, a risk which should
be protected against under other insurance coverages. Bodily injury
damages include all damages which arise out of personal injury or
death of the insured, including not only general damages but also
special damages, such as medical or funeral expenses and loss of in-
come or support. Damages for loss of consortium also should be in-
cluded under Act 202 of 1982.
Recovery of medical expenses under both the medical payments
and UM coverages of the same policy may be precluded by policy
language.98 Such credit or reduction clauses are enforceable insofar
as they preclude double recovery.9 However, if the limits of the UM
coverage are inadequate to compensate the insured for his other
damages, the insurer cannot credit payments made under the medical
coverage against the UM coverage limits."° Furthermore, the collateral
source rule is applicable to UM claims; thus the insurer is not entitled
93. Fox v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
Gray v. Margot Inc., 408 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Carlise v. State Dep't
of Transp. & Dev., 400 So.2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 404 So. 2d 1256 (La.
1981).
94. LA. R.S. 23:1032.
95. Gray v. Margot Inc., 408 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
96. E.g., Watkins v. Doe, 301 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Hernandez v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
97. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2323 (effective Aug. 1, 1980).
98. Policy provisions vary, but generally both the medical payments coverage and
the UM coverage contain provisions for crediting payments made under one coverage
against the limits of liability of the other coverage.
99. White v. Patterson, 409 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 412
So. 2d 1110 (La. 1982).
100. Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974);
Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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to credit for those payments from other sources for which the tort-
feasor woud not be entitled to credit."1
The UM claim must be based upon bodily injury to an insured;
it cannot be predicated upon damages sustained by an insured as a
result of bodily injury to someone who was not an insured under the
policy. For example, in Chapman v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 0 2 a father
was not permitted to recover under his UM coverage for the wrongful
death of his son who was not an insured under that policy.0 3 The
"per person" limits of the UM coverage apply to all claims arising
out of the bodily injury of one person, even though more than one
person may be entitled to recover. For example, if the "per person"
limit has been exhausted in payment of a child's bodily injury damages,
a father cannot successfully seek recovery for the child's additional.
medical expenses by claiming entitlement to a separate "per person"
limit.1°4
Caused by Accident
Insurance policies normally require that the bodily injury be
caused by accident. In Redden v. Doe,"'1 the insured, a bank
messenger, was intentionally forced off the highway by robbers. Her
car landed upside down in a bayou, and she received injuries as she
escaped through a broken window. The first circuit held that the issue
of whether an injury is accidental must be examined from the vic-
tim's standpoint. The UM insurer argued that the accident ended when
the car came to rest in the bayou and the injuries resulted from a
battery committed by the robber as he "assisted" the insured through
the window. However, the court held that the plaintiffs injuries were
sustained by escaping from the partially submerged automobile and
were a direct consequence of the accident.
On the other hand, the insured in Mangum v. Weigel,1' 6 was in-
volved in a minor accident in the French Quarter. The other driver
emerged from his vehicle shouting obscenities at the insured, came
to the insured's vehicle, and repeatedly punched the insured in the
101. Hawthorne v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
102. 306 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
103. See also LaFleur v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 385 So. 2d 1241 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980) (the insured was not permitted to recover for wrongful death of her
mother because the mother did not qualify as an insured under the policy).
104. Generally, this limitation is spelled out clearly in the policy and is enforced
by the courts. Graham v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d
22 (1972); Vega v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981);
Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
105. 357 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
106. 393 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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face through the open window. He then opened the door and continued
the assault, causing severe injuries. The UM insurer denied that the
injuries were caused by accident or arose out of the use of an unin-
sured vehicle. The fourth circuit held that the injuries, which resulted
solely from the battery committed by the uninsured motorist, were
not caused by accident. Redden was distinguished because there the
injuries were sustained in escaping from the vehicle. The court in
Mangum also found that the incident did not arise out of the "use"
of the uninsured vehicle. The holding on "use" appears to be the more
valid distinction between Redden and Mangum. Otherwise, if deter-
mined from the innocent insured's viewpoint, apparently any inten-
tional assault which arose out of the use of an uninsured vehicle would
be a covered accident.
Arising out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use
Policies generally provide that bodily injury damages must be
caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of such uninsured highway vehicle."7 Although there have been
few UM cases on this point, the issue of whether an accident arises
out of the use of a vehicle has been much litigated in other contexts."°8
Generally, the courts have rejected artificial tests in favor of "com-
mon sense" when determining whether the negligent act was a natural
and reasonable consequence of the use of the vehicle within the con-
templation of the parties to the insurance contract."° As pointed out
107. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D(1)(a) does not use that language, but the requirement is con-
sistent with the mandated coverage: "from owners or operators of uninsured and
underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including
death, resulting therefrom; . . . " (emphasis added). Actually, resulting therefrom im-
plies a direct causal connection which may be more restrictive than the policy re-
quirement of arising out of.
108. Automobile liability policies cover liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, and use of automobiles, whereas the personal liability coverage under
homeowner's policies and comprehensive general liability policies exclude such liabili-
ty. There are several cases dealing with the issue of whether an accident arises out
of the use of a vehicle. Picou v. Ferrara, 412 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1982); LeJeune v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d 471 (La. 1978); Fertitta v. Palmer, 252 La. 336, 211 So. 2d 282
(1968); Curry v. Iberville Parish Sheriffs Office, 405 So. 2d 1387 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (La. 1982); Young v. E & L Lumber Co., 392
So. 2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Johns v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 349 So.
2d 481 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Tillman v. Canal Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 602 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1974); Ramsey v. Continental Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973);
Cagle v. Playland Amusement. Inc., 202 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Baudin
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Speziale v. Kohnke,
194 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d
544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
109. Fertitta v. Palmer, 252 La. 336, 211 So. 2d 282 (1968); Speziale v. Kohnke,
194 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). In Baudin v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 201
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in the preceding section, the court in Mangum v. Weigle concluded
that an assault at the hands of an uninsured motorist did not arise
out of "use."
Obviously, there must be an uninsured or underinsured motor vehi-
cle involved in the accident. Thus, in McDaniel v. Moore," ° there was
no coverage for the insureds' collision with a horse based upon the
fault of those who permitted its escape. On the other hand, as il-
lustrated by Duvigneaud v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,
the motor vehicle need not necessarily be the direct cause of the ac-
cident. While riding his motorcycle, the insured was overtaken and
overturned by a large dog. In making claim under his UM coverage,
the insured was able to trace the dog to the owner of an uninsured
vehicle. The owner had negligently permitted the dog to escape from
this vehicle. The court affirmed the jury finding that the accident arose
out of "use" of the vehicle from which the dog escaped. Arguably,
the Duvigneaud case is beyond a "common sense" relationship between
the accident and the uninsured vehicle.
EXCLUSIONS
UM policies generally contain exclusions similar to those discussed
below:
"This policy does not apply to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying a highway vehicle"' (other than an insured automobile) owned
So. 2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), the court listed a number of factors which should
be considered in making the arising out of use determination:
(1) The dangerous situation causing injury must have its source in the automobile;
(2) The chain of events resulting in the accident must originate in the use of the
automobile and be unbroken by the intervention of any event which has no direct
or substantial relation to the use of the vehicle; (3) The accident must be a natural
and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle for the purposes
contemplated by the policy, although not necessarily foreseen or expected; (4) The
accident must be one which can be "immediately identified" with the use of the
automobile as contemplated by the parties to the policy; (5) The accident must
be of a type reasonably associated with the use of the automobile as contemplated
by the contracting parties; (6) The accident must be one which would not have
happened "but for" the use of the automobile.
201 So. 2d at 384-85.
110. 351 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
111. 363 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ refused, 366 So. 2d 560 (La. 1979).
112. Some policies substitute automobile for highway vehicle. This leads to a discus-
sion of whether a motorcycle is an automobile within the meaning of this exclusion.
See, e.g., Brister v. American Indem. Co., 313 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (holding
that the term automobile does not include a motorcycle); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.
2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972) (the policy
language used the term automobile rather than highway vehicle; the court noted that
in "its general and popular use" the word automobile would not comprehend a motor-
cycle, but in this policy, the definition of automobile, while specifically excluding cer-
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by the named insured or a relative or through. being struck by such
an automobile."
The above exclusion has been held to be contrary to the UM
coverage mandated by statute. '13 The courts reason that the statute
requires UM coverage for an insured regardless of his location at the
time of his injury by an uninsured motorist."' The rationale has been
applied to the named insured" 5 and relatives"6 defined as UM insureds
without any requirement that they be occupying the insured
automobile. The exclusion has been held ineffective for insureds oc-
cupying both the insured"7 and uninsured vehicles."8
For example, in Earl v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,"9 a father
owned two automobiles, one insured by Aetna and the other insured
by Commercial Union. His daughter, a relative as defined in the
policies, was injured through the negligence of an uninsured motorist
while operating the auto insured by Aetna. The court refused to
apply the exclusion in the Commercial Union policy, thus allowing
recovery under the UM provisions of both policies. Likewise, in
Thomas v. Nelson,2 ° the insured's sons were injured when their unin-
tain types of land vehicles, did not specifically exclude motorcycles; the court found
that automobile in this policy included a motorcycle).
113. Earl v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980);
Bourgeois v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 385 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980);
Griffin v. Armond, 358 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Hayden v. Torrence, 355
So. 2d 1362 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), writ dismissed, 341 So. 2d 408 (La. 1977); Thomas v. Nelson,
295 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), writ denied, 299 So. 2d 791 (La. 1974); Rascoe
v. Wilburn, 295 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.
2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972).
114. Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d at 918. This rationale does not appear to be
compelled by the statute. Since the mandated coverage is tied to the issuance of
automobile liability policies, the issue could be resolved by considering whether the
insured would be afforded liability protection while using the vehicle under the excluded
circumstances. Liability policies generally exclude coverage for accidents arising out
of the use of another automobile owned by the named insured or a relative.
115. E.g., Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976),
writ dismissed, 341 So. 2d 408 (La. 1977); Rascoe v. Wilburn, 295 So. 2d 201 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974).
116. E.g., Earl v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980);
Bourgeois v. United States Fid. Guar. Co., 385 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
117. E.g., Earl v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980)
(different insurers); Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973) (same insurer).
118. Bourgeois v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 385 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Armond, 358 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Eledge v. War-
ren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972).
119. 391 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
120. 295 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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sured motorcycle was struck by an uninsured motorist. The father
owned three automobiles insured under a policy issued by Travelers.
The court held that Travelers afforded UM coverage for the sons,
since the exclusion for other owned highway vehicles was
unenforceable.
"This policy does not apply to bodily injury to an insured with
respect to which such insured.. . shall without written consent of the
company make any settlement with any person ... who may be liable
therefor." This exclusion has been held to be unenforceable."'
"This policy does not apply so as to inure directly or indirectly
to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability carrier.
." The Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act reserves the right of
injured workmen to recover damages from third persons and further
provides that any person obligated to pay compensation may main-
tain a suit against such third person for recovery of any amount which
he has paid or become obligated to pay as compensation to an
employee."' Workers' compensation carriers have sought to recoup
their payments out of UM coverage available to the injured worker.
The courts of appeal have held unanimously that workers' compensa-
tion insurers have no right to assert a claim for UM coverage.'23 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has granted writs in the latest such
decision.'1
Either through a general exclusion or an exclusion from the defini-
tion of insured automobile, policies generally deny coverage to anyone
occupying the automobile without the permission of the owner or while
using the insured automobile for public or livery conveyance. These
exclusions have not been tested in reported appellate decisions.
However, they should be enforceable insofar as they exclude coverage
for persons under circumstances in which that person would likewise
be excluded from the liability coverage of the policy."'
121. Niemann v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979). See text at notes
154-161, infra (Subrogation and the Right to Settle).
122. See LA. R.S. 23:1101-1103 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
123. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
granted, 413 So. 2d 906 (La. 1982); Lute v. City of Lake Charles, 394 So. 2d 736 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1981); Bannon v. Edrington, 392 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Gen-
try v. Pugh, 362 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 363 So. 2d 922 (La. 1978).
Cf. Youngs v. Champagne, 348 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (the court sustained
the exception of no cause of action of the UM insurer of the plaintiff to the third
party demand for contribution filed by the liability insurer of an alleged cotortfeasor
of the uninsured motorist).
124. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
granted, 413 So. 2d 906 (La. 1982).
125. But see cases cited in note 113, supra. The coverage anytime, anywhere ap-




Policies providing UM coverage generally contain reduction clauses
which provide that sums received from other sources will be credited
against the limits of liability under the UM coverage. Credit is general-
ly provided for sums received from others liable for the bodily injury
damages of the insured, from amounts payable under any workers'
compensation law, and from sums due under any other coverage of
the same policy.'
Even before the statutory advent of "underinsured" motorist
coverage, Smith v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co."7 held that the
reduction clause for sums received from other persons liable for the
insured's bodily. injury was unenforceable. The insured had been in-
jured by the joint negligence of an insured motorist and an uninsured
motorist. The court held that the credit in effect would reduce the
UM coverage below the limits required by statute.
Any credit reducing the UM limits by the amount of the liability
insurance of the adverse driver is clearly contrary to the underinsured
motorist protection required by statute. The insured is entitled to
recover, subject to the limits of his policy, the difference between
his damages and the liability insurance of the negligent motorist."8
of these exclusions against the named insured and relatives. However, such use would
be an illogical extension beyond the scope of the liability coverage with which UM
coverage is paired under LA. R.S. 22:1406(D).
126. The following provisions from insurance policies (see note 43, supra) are ex-
amples of reduction clauses:
Any amount payable under the [UM coverage] because of bodily injuries sus-
tained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this coverage. shall
be reduced by (1) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of
[il the owner or operator of the uninsured highway vehicle and [ii] any other per-
son or organization jointly or severally liable together with such owner or operator
for such bodily injury including all sums paid under [the liability coverage of this
policy], and (2) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable
on account of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disabili-
ty law or any similar law.
Any payment made under this coverage to or for any insured shall be applied
in reduction of the amount of damages which he may be entitled to recover from
any person insured under [the liability coverage of this policy].
The company shall not be obligated to pay under this coverage that part of
the damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of the uninsured highway vehicle which represents expenses for medical
services paid or payable under [the medical payments coverage of this policy].
127. 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); see also Hebert v. Ordoyne, 388 So.
2d 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
128. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b). If the insured had UM limits of $10,000 and bodily in-
jury damages of $15,000 and if the negligent motorist had liability limits of $5,000,
it would be contrary to the concept of "underinsured motorist" protection to credit
the $5,000 liability coverage against the $10,000 UM limits. Under his UM coverage,
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A distinction must be made between that credit against UM limits
provided for in the unenforceable reduction clause and the credit for
sums received from other sources to which the UM insurer is entitl-
ed. The UM insurer is responsible only for the bodily injury damages
of an insured which are in excess of the liability insurance of the
negligent motorist and which have not been paid by the negligent
motorist or someone responsible for his fault or someone solidarily
liable with him.
The credit provision for workers' compensation payments also has
been held to be unenforceable. Overruling an earlier decision,"2 the
second circuit held, in Williams v. Buckelew3 ° that credit for workers'
compensation benefits received by the insured would have the effect
of reducing UM protection below the limits required by statute.
Therefore, the reduction clause was unenforceable. In Williams,
however, the court specifically stated that there was no question of
double recovery because the amount of the plaintiffs damages substan-
tially exceeded the sum of his UM policy limits and the workers' com-
pensation benefits paid. A subsequent decision from another circuit
refused to apply the credit provision, even under circumstances in
which the insured recovered the same medical expenses both as
workers' compensation benefits and under UM coverage."1
The credit for medical expenses is enforceable only insofar as it
prevents recovery of the same medical expenses under both UM
coverage and medical payments coverage. If the limits of UM coverage
are inadequate to compensate the insured for his other damages, the
insurer cannot credit payments made under medical coverage against
the liability limits of the UM coverage."
With respect to payments under the same policy, reduction clauses,
usually provide that any sum paid under liability coverage shall be
credited against the UM limits and any sum paid under the UM
coverage shall be credited against the liability limits. To the extent
that the reduction of either limit would prevent the insured from
receiving the full benefit of his UM coverage, courts likely will find
the insured is entitled to recover the amount of his damages in excess of the liability
coverage.
129. Allen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1966), writ refused, 249 La. 743, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966).
130. 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
131. Landry v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
see also Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). This reduc-
tion clause is discussed in Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1978-1979 Term-Workers' Compensation, 40 LA. L. REV. 742 (1980).




such clauses inconsistent with the mandatory coverage of the UM
statute. For example, in circumstances such as existed in Casson v.
Dairyland Insurance Co.,'33 in which the insured maintained both a
liability and a UM claim under the same policy, the reduction clauses
are probably unenforceable."u
STACKING OF MULTIPLE COVERAGES
In 1972, the supreme court, in Graham v. American Casualty Co.'35
and Deane v. McGee,'6 overruled numerous decisions from all four
courts of appeal in order to permit "stacking" of the coverages under
uninsured motorist policies. Policies often contained "other insurance"
clauses which were designed to limit recovery to the highest limits
available under any one policy."3 7 In Graham and Deane, the supreme
court found that such clauses were inconsistent with the UM statute's
requirement that each liability policy contain UM coverage in a
specified minimum amount.
In Graham, the plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile
which collided with an uninsured motorist. There was no UM coverage
on the vehicle in which she was riding. However, the plaintiff owned
a vehicle and her father, with whom she was residing, owned two
vehicles, each insured under separate Southern Farm policies with
$5,000 UM limits. Under the "other insurance" provisions of each
policy, the plaintiffs recovery would have been limited to a total of
$5,000, prorated among the three policies. The supreme court found
the "other insurance" provisions in conflict with the coverage man-
133. 400 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
134. The court in Casson awarded the full amount of both the liability and the
UM coverages without discussion of whether the policy contained such reduction clauses
or their enforceability. For further discussion of Casson, see text at notes 80-82, supra.
135. 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972).
136. 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 269 (1972). See Note, Uninsured Motorist Insurance-
Stacking Comes to Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 145 (1972).
137. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
not owned by the named insured, this insurance shall apply only as excess in-
surance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable
to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only
to the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the ap-
plicable limit of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher applicable limits of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater pro-
portion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability
hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance.
See note 43, supra.
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dated by statute and permitted the plaintiff to recover the $5,000
policy limit of each policy.
In Deane, the plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile
covered by two UM policies, each with a limit of $5,000. The plaintiff
also owned an automobile in Florida with $10,000 UM limits. Under
the "other insurance" provisions of the plaintiff's policy, his coverage
would be'excess and available only if the primary policies did not
provide the Florida statutory minimum of $10,000. Again, the supreme
court held that the "other insurance" clause was ineffective, and the
plaintiff was permitted to recover the policy limits under all three
applicable policies.
The courts of appeal quickly extended the rationale of Graham
and Deane to strike down other policy provisions restricting recovery
under UM policies. In Crenwelge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 3 the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of
an uninsured motorist while driving one of two cars he owned. The
cars were insured under separate State Farm policies. Each policy
contained an express exclusion of coverage for an insured who was
injured while occupying another automobile owned by the named in-
sured. Thus, if effective, the exclusion would preclude recovery under
the policy on the vehicle which was not involved in the accident.
However, construing Graham and Deane as requiring that each policy
provide the statutory minimum coverage, the court of appeal held that
the plaintiff could recover under both policies." Likewise, the court
of appeal, in Smith v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,"' found a reduc-
tion clause invalid. The policy provision gave credit against the UM
limits for the amount of any recovery from other persons. The court
held that the reduction clause was not enforceable because such credit
would reduce the UM coverage below the statutory minimum limit.'
Graham and Deane permitted the stacking of coverages under
separate policies. In Barbin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,'
the supreme court applied the same reasoning to coverage for multi-
ple vehicles insured under one policy. Barbin, as driver, and his wife
138. 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
139. For further discussion, see text at notes 112-125, supra (Exclusions).
140. 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
141. For further discussion, see text at notes 126-134, supra (Reduction Clauses).
142. 315 So. 2d 754 (La. 1975). Following Barbin, stacking was permitted even under
fleet policies insuring many vehicles. Holmes v. Reliance Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 1102
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 1120 (La. 1978) (160 vehicles). But see Briley
v. Falati, 367 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1979),
which held that a person insured only as an occupant of one of the vehicles covered




and two other couples, as passengers, were occupying one of two
automobiles insured under a single policy. The court permitted the
stacking of coverages for both automobiles not only for Barbin and
his wife (as named insureds) but also for the passengers, who were
insured only "while occupying an insured automobile." Straining the
policy language, the court pointed out that an insured automobile was
defined as "an automobile described in the policy" and concluded that
passengers were entitled to stack the limits for both vehicles while
occupying either insured vehicle. In Seaton v. Kelley,' however, the
supreme court reached the limit of its expansive approach to stack-
ing. Seaton was factually similar to Barbin, with the exception that
multiple vehicles were insured under separate policies issued by the
same insurer. The court held that a passenger (who was not a named
insured or a relative) was entitled to recover only under the policy
on the vehicle which he was occupying at the time of the accident;
the passenger was not an insured under the separate policies on other
vehicles owned by the same named insured. Thus, after Barbin and
Seaton, for persons insured only as occupants, stacking was depen-
dent upon whether the insurer chose to insure multiple vehicles under
a single policy or under separate policies.
The prostacking decisions arose in an era when the mandated UM
coverage limits were the minimal $5,000/$10,000 limits. Amendments
to the statute in 1972, 1974, and 1977 greatly expanded the insured's
right to acquire UM protection.' With this increased access to UM
coverage, the legislature was persuaded to adopt Act 623 of 1977,
which is known as the "anti-stacking" provision. The Act amends
22:1406(D)(1)(c) to prohibit stacking of multiple UM coverages available
to the same insured, except under limited circumstances. Recovery
under more than one policy is prohibited, except when the insured
is injured "while occupying an automobile not owned by said injured
party." Then, the statutory exception permits the injured party to
recover under the UM coverage on the vehicle in which he is riding
(as primary coverage) and also under one other UM policy available
to him (as excess coverage).
The anti-stacking provision was first construed by the supreme
court in Courville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'1
5
Courville, Sr. owned two vehicles-a 1964 pick-up and a 1968 Olds-
each insured under separate State Farm policies. His son, Courville,
Jr., while driving the 1964 pick-up, was seriously injured by the
negligence of an uninsured motorist. Courville, Jr., sought to stack
143. 339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976); see also Schmidt v. Estate of Choron, 376 So. 2d
579 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
144. See text at notes 8-11, 14-16, 28-30 & 34-35, supra.
145. 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981).
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the UM coverages under both State Farm policies. Although clearly
entitled to the full limits of the policy on the 1964 pick-up, Courville,
Jr. could recover under the policy on the 1968 Olds only if he was
within the exception of the anti-stacking provision. Technically, since
the truck was owned by his father, Courville, Jr. was within the
statutory exception for one injured "while occupying an automobile
not owned by said injured party."
The third circuit,"'e however, refused to apply the exception literal-
ly, finding that the exception must be read in pari materia with the
entire anti-stacking provision. The purpose of the provision was to
override legislatively the jurisprudence which permitted stacking of
multiple coverages, whether under the same policies or multiple
policies available to the same insured. The main theme of the provi-
sion is that a person can recover under only one UM policy. General-
ly, the UM policy of the vehicle involved in the accident will afford
the only applicable coverage. However, if an injured person were
always relegated to that coverage alone, he would be at the mercy
of the foresight of everyone with whom he rode. Therefore, the obvious
intent of the exception contained in the Act was to afford an insured,
when riding with others, the protection of his own UM coverage, in
addition to whatever coverage was available on the vehicle in which
he was riding.
If Courville, Sr. were the injured party, then under the anti-
stacking provision, he-could recover only under one policy because
as owner he would not be within the statutory exception. The third
circuit concluded that it would be a "legal absurdity" to permit another
person to stack the two policies when the insured owner could not.
Instead, it construed the exception to be inapplicable to any other
coverage provided by the owner of the occupied vehicle; thus
nonowner occupants could not stack coverage purchased for other
vehicles by the owner of the occupied vehicle. This interpretation
placed the owner and the occupant in the same position with respect
to such other coverage.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the language of the ex-
ception was clear and unambiguous and that under Civil Code article
13, courts were not free to disregard the letter of the law in pursuit
of its spirit. Therefore, Courville, Jr. was permitted to recover the
full limits of both State Farm policies. The supreme court suggested
that legislation was necessary if the Act did not express its true intent.
Courville involved two vehicles insured under separate policies.
The first circuit has extended the supreme court's interpretation of
146. 386 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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the anti-stacking exception in Courville to a single policy covering
multiple vehicles. In Bonner v. Robinson,"7 the plaintiff, a major child
residing with his parents, was injured while driving one of three cars
owned by his mother and insured under a single policy. The plaintiff
was permitted to recover the UM limits applicable to the vehicle he
was driving, plus the limits applicable to one additional vehicle. The
court held that the statute did not distinguish between separate
vehicles insured under separate policies and multiple vehicles insured
under the same policy.
In Nall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"' the
supreme court made clear the conditions which must exist in order
to apply the anti-stacking exception. The plaintiff, insured under two
separate State Farm policies, was injured while a guest passenger
in an automobile insured by GEICO. The accident was caused solely
by the negligence of the plaintiffs host driver. The UM coverage on
the host vehicle was not applicable,"9 and the plaintiff sought recovery
under both of his own State Farm policies. The supreme court held
that three conditions must be present in order for the anti-stacking
exception to apply: (1) the injured party must have been occupying
an automobile not owned by him; (2) there must be UM coverage on
the occupied vehicle, which coverage is primary; and (3) there must
be at least one other UM coverage available to the injured party who
has not been fully compensated for his damages. Since the second
condition was not present (there was no UM coverage available on
the host vehicle), the plaintiff was limited by the general rule to
recovery under one State Farm policy. The court held that State Farm
had not waived the benefit of the anti-stacking provision by issuing
separate policies on the plaintiffs two vehicles or by attaching an
endorsement to each policy which expanded the policy language to
include the underinsured motorist protection mandated by statute.
When the plaintiff is injured while occupying an insured
automobile, must he accept the coverage on that vehicle or may he
select another, more favorable policy? A conflict in the jurisprudence
leaves this issue unresolved. In Branch v. O'Brien," the plaintiff
owned four vehicles, each insured under separate State Farm policies.
Three of the policies, including the policy on the vehicle in which the
plaintiff was riding when she was injured by an uninsured motorist,
had UM limits of $10,000. The other policy, however, had UM limits
of $100,000. Each of these policies expressly excluded coverage for
the insured while occupying any other vehicle owned by the insured.
147. 415 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
148. 406 So. 2d 216 (La. 1981).
149. See text at notes 78-82, supra.
150. 396 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 905 (La. 1981).
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The second circuit applied the anti-stacking provision to limit the
insured to recovery under one policy. However, the court further held
that she was not restricted to the policy on the vehicle in which she
was riding. Citing the jurisprudence prior to the anti-stacking provi-
sion, the court found that the exclusion of coverage while occupying
other owned vehicles was contrary to the mandatory requirement of
UM coverage and that nothing in the anti-stacking provision affected
this requirement. Therefore, although the plaintiff was limited to one
policy, she was free to choose the policy most advantageous to her.
However, the first circuit disagreed in Breaux v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co."1' The plaintiff owned two vehicles, a
motorcycle insured by Home Indemnity Company with UM limits of
$10,000 and an automobile insured by Farm Bureau with UM coverage
of $50,000. The plaintiff, while riding the motorcycle, was injured
through the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The court held that
the anti-stacking provision was applicable, even though the UM policies
were issued by different companies. Since he was limited to one policy,
the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to select the more
favorable Farm Bureau policy. Although the court agreed that the
exclusion for other owned autos was unenforceable, the Breaux court
expressly disagreed with the Branch conclusion and found that the
intent of the anti-stacking provision was for the policy on the acci-
dent vehicle to be the applicable coverage. Therefore, the plaintiff was
limited to the coverage on the motorcycle. The Breaux decision is in
accord with the apparent, but not express, intent of the anti-stacking
provision. The only express reference to such "primary" coverage is
in the exception for occupancy of a nonowned automobile. The supreme
court has denied writ applications in both Branch and Breaux.
The applicability of the anti-stacking provision to policies issued
or renewed prior to the provision's effective date is an interesting
issue. All prior amendments to the UM statute had expanded the man-
datory coverage, and courts uniformly held that such amendments
were applicable only to policies issued or renewed after the effective
date of the amendment.152 However, policies issued prior to the effec-
tive date of the anti-stacking amendment normally contained "other
insurance" clauses which, if enforceable, would prevent stacking. Prior
to the amendment, these "other insurance" clauses could not be en-
forced because of the judicial conclusion that they were in conflict
with the mandatory coverage provisions of the UM statute. The first,
151. 413 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 453 (La. 1982).
152. E.g., O'Banion v. Allstate Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Lindsey
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1975); Lorio v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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second, and third circuits have held that the "other insurance" clauses
in preamendment policies are effective for post-amendment accidents
because the anti-stacking amendment removes the jurisprudential bar-
rier to enforceability."5 They found no problem with impairment of
contract because the policies contained the "other insurance" clauses.
SUBROGATION AND THE RIGHT TO SETTLE
Insurance policies generally provide that the company is
subrogated to the extent of any payment under UM coverage to the
insured's rights of recovery against any person. Further, the insured
is obligated to do whatever is necessary to secure such rights and
not to do anything to prejudice such rights."M In addition, policies
generally contain an express exclusion of coverage for any insured
who settles without the written consent of the company with anyone
legally liable for his bodily injury. Prior to Niemann v. Travelers In-
surance Co.," the courts enforced the subrogation and consent-to-settle
policy provisions." In Niemann, however, a sharply divided Louisiana
Supreme Court severely restricted the rights of the insurer to seek
reimbursement of amounts paid under UM coverage. The insured had
settled with the liability insurer of the negligent motorist for an
amount nearly equal to the limits of his liability coverage. The in-
sured expressly released both the negligent motorist and his liability
insurer without seeking the consent of his own UM insurer. When
the insured, claiming that he had not been fully compensated for his
153. Blbck v. Reliance Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Faria v.
Smoak, 416 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Hebert v. Breaux, 398 So. 2d 1299
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d 986 (La. 1981). However, the policy language
is not effective for preamendment accidents. Manuel v. American Indem. Co., 368 So.
2d 1200 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Cutrer v. Brumfield, 372 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979).
154. In lieu of or in addition to a subrogation clause, some policies contain a trust
agreement in which the insured agrees to pursue recovery against a third party at
the request and expense of the insurer and to hold any recovery in trust for the in-
surer. The trust agreement was designed to protect against the possibility that a com-
mon law prohibition against assignment of personal injury claims would be applied
against a subrogation claim.
155. 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979) (three justices dissented).
156. E.g., Gauthreaux v. Travelers Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977);
Lorio v. Safeco Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (withdrawn from the
Reporter at the request of the court). But see Whitten v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 353 So. 2d 1071 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); LaBove v. American Employers Ins. Co.,
189 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). Restrictions on the rights of the insurer under
the subrogation and consent-to-settle provisions had been imposed prior to Niemann
in Hebert v. Green, 311 So. 2d 223 (La. 1975), which held that the insurer could not
prevent settlement with a joint tortfeasor of the uninsured motorist (with respect




damages, made demand upon his UM insurer, it defended on the
ground that the insured had breached the subrogation and consent-
to-settle provisions of the policy. Reversing the lower courts, the
supreme court held that these provisions were not enforceable because
the insurer was vested only with a limited right of reimbursement
under the provisions of 22:1406(D)(4)"7 and had no right to control the
insured's settlement with the negligent motorist or his liability in-
surer. In justifying this extremely narrow reading of the statute, the
majority pointed to the insured's dilemma in UM situations. The liabili-
ty insurer of the negligent motorist will generally require the injured
party to release both it and its insured before the liability insurer
will voluntarily settle for its policy limits. On the other hand, the in-
jured insured's UM carrier will, in many cases, refuse consent to such
settlement in order to preserve its subrogation claim against the
negligent motorist. Thus, if the subrogation and consent-to-settle pro-
visions were enforceable, the UM insurer, for its own self interest,
could retard compensation of the accident victim.
In Bond v. Commercial Assurance Co.,"8 the supreme court par-
tially resurrected the subrogation rights of the insurer. After suit
was filed against the UM carrier, it filed a third party demand for
indemnity against the negligent underinsured motorist. Relying on
Niemann, the court of appeal dismissed the third party demand. On
rehearing, the supreme court reversed, holding that upon payment,
an insurer, pursuant to a subrogation agreement contained in its policy,
becomes conventionally subrogated to its insured's right against the
tortfeasor. The holding in Niemann was restricted to the proposition
"that an insurer may not enforce a clause excluding uninsured motorist
coverage in the event of its insured's failure to obtain its consent
before entering a reasonable settlement with an underinsured tort-
feasor and his insurer." '59 This conclusion was justified by the court
on the ground that such an exclusion would conflict with the aim of
the UM statute to promote full recovery of all damages suffered by
innocent motorists.
The net effect of Niemann and Bond is that an insurer may be
conventionally subrogated to its insured's rights against the negligent
157. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) provides:
In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this Sec-
tion and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer mak-
ing such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any
settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of
such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury for which such payment is made, including the proceeds recoverable from
-the assets of the insolvent insurer.
158. 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981).
159. Id. at 411.
[Vol. 43
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
motorist, but that subrogation right is subject to impairment by an
insured who enters into a "reasonable settlement" with the tortfeasor
and his liability insurer. The precariousness of the subrogation right
was emphasized by the decision in Pace v. Cage.'60 The insured filed
suit against the negligent motorist, the insurer, and his own UM car-
rier. The UM carrier filed a third party demand against the negligent
motorist. After the insured settled with the original defendants, the
UM carrier refused to dismiss its third party demand. Upon the
stipulation that the insured had completely discharged the tortfeasor
prior to any payment by the UM carrier, the supreme court held that
the UM carrier no longer had a cause of action against the tortfeasor.
One judge dissented, suggesting that the court had not come to grips
with whether 22:1406(D)(4) grants an independent right of recovery
to the UM insurer against the tortfeasor.
If the UM carrier settles with its insured first, may the insured
subsequently settle with and release the tortfeasor and his liability
insurer, or are the subrogation rights of the UM carrier then vested
by virtue of the prior settlement? This issue does not appear to be
resolved by the prior jurisprudence. Since public policy considerations
in this area seem to prevail over ordinary notions about subrogation
rights, the resolution of this remaining issue must await further
weighing of those considerations by the supreme court.
Recent decisions emphasize that the claim of the partially
subrogated insurer is subordinate to the insured's claim. The insured
is entitled to recover the remainder of his damages before the in-
surer is entitled to recover on its subrogation claim.1 6' The
jurisprudence also permits the tortfeasor to assert inability to pay
in mitigation of a subrogation claim, but such an assertion by the tort-




Jurisdiction and Conflicts of Law
Plaintiff, a California resident, was injured in Louisiana while a
guest passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by a Louisiana resi-
dent. Plaintiff owned an auto in California insured by Western Pioneer,
a company which was not authorized to do and did no insurance
160. 419 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982).
161. Suhor v. Gusse, 414 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1982); Bond v. Commercial Union Assur.
Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981); Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So.
2d 178 (La. 1981).
162. Bond v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981), on remand,
415 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) ($50,483.41 subrogation claim mitigated to $5,000).
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business in Louisiana. In Hall v. Scott,'68 which the supreme court has
agreed to review, the first circuit followed the third circuit decision
in Jones v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.,"' and held that Louisiana courts
have no jurisdiction over foreign insurers on contractual claims for
UM benefits. Neither the Long-Arm Statute... nor the Non-Resident
Motorist Act 6 ' provided jurisdiction over the foreign insurer. Further-
more, the mere foreseeablity that its insured would travel to Loui-
siana and become involved in an accident was not a sufficient
" minimum contact" for jurisdiction. 7 When jurisdiction is not con-
tested, there appears to be a conflict in the circuits as to whether
Louisiana law or the law of the state in which the policy was issued
is applicable. In Sutton v. Langley,"' the second circuit applied Loui-
siana law to interpret a Texas policy issued to a Texas resident who
was injured in a Louisiana accident. The court refused to apply the
Texas guest passenger statute and permitted stacking of multiple
coverages, which was not allowed under Texas law. The second cir-
cuit held that it was not bound to apply the law of the state of the
contract where, on balance, Louisiana had a greater interest in the
action."'
In Powell v. Warner, 70 however, the fourth circuit held that Miss-
issippi residents injured in a Louisiana accident were not entitled to
recover underinsured motorist benefits under the UM coverage of
their Mississippi policies. Mississippi law did not require and the
policies did not provide underinsured motorist protection. 7' Despite
163. 416 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ granted, 420 So. 2d 978 (La. 1982).
164. 398 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 399 So. 2d 586 (La. 1981).
165. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964 & 1977). This statute enumerates certain cir-
cumstances in which Louisiana courts will have personal jurisdiction, none of which
would support a claim under uninsured motorist coverage on a policy issued and
delivered outside of Louisiana.
166. LA. R.S. 13:3474 (1950 & Supp. 1954 & 1956). By operating a motor vehicle in
Louisiana, a nonresident and his insurer are deemed to have submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of this state and to have appointed the secretary of state as their agent for ser-
vice of process. By its terms, this statute appears to be applicable only to liability
claims against the nonresident and his insurer.
167. The court relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
168. 330 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 332 So. 2d 805 (La. 1976).
169. The second circuit relied on the balance-of-interests test adopted by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court in Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973), in which
the court rejected the premise that the law of the place of the tort should always
be applied. The second circuit suggested that the same rationale applied to contract law.
170. 398 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
171. The court distinguished Sutton on the ground that the motorist was uninsured
in Sutton, whereas the plaintiffs in Powell had recovered a portion of their damages
from liability insurance. However, there was an insured cotortfeasor in Sutton. In any
event, the distinction should not make any difference. The refusal in Sutton to apply
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the fourth circuit's attempt to distinguish Sutton, the two decisions
appear to be in conflict.
By its express language, the UM statute is applicable only to in-
surance policies on motor vehicles "registered or principally garaged
in this state." 7 ' Unless the Louisiana statute mandates coverage for
the vehicle insured under the policy, it would seem preferable for
the law of the state in which the policy was issued to determine what
coverage was available under that policy.
Notice
Insurance policies generally require the insured to give prompt
notice of an accident.1 73 However, the general rule17 1 that the insurer
cannot escape liability for late notice absent actual prejudice is ap-
plicable to UM claims. The cases indicate an extreme reluctance to
find actual prejudice.' 75
Cooperation
UM policies generally provide that the insured must cooperate
with the company by furnishing medical reports and submitting to
medical examinations at the request of the company. These provisions
are enforceable. Failure to comply is a breach of contract which en-
titles the insurer to a dismissal of the action brought by the insured.7 1
the Texas Guest Passenger Statute can be justified on the ground that the law of
the place where the accident occurred should determine whether the uninsured motorist
is legally liable to the UM insured. However, the stacking requirement in Sutton can-
not be rationalized with Powell. Both stacking and underinsured motorist coverage
were available only under the mandatory provisions of the Louisiana UM statute.
172. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a). Cf. Ricardo v. American Indem. Co., 201 So. 2d 145 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1967).
173. The phrases "as soon as practicable" or "as soon as possible" are included
in the policies.
174. See Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
175. In Barnes v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 308 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1975), first notice was given almost three years after the accident. The court found
that there was no factual showing of prejudice and rejected the contention of legal
prejudice due to prescription of any subrogation claim against the tortfeasor. The court
refused to presume that the negligent party would plead prescriptiorl. In Davis v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973), suit almost one year after
the accident was the insurer's first notice. Delay was excused' because of the insured's
belief that the negligent motorist had insurance. The court emphasized that the in-
surer did not claim any fraudulent intent on the part of the insured and had not shown
any specific prejudice. Although the proof of prejudice was insufficient to avoid lia-
bility in Hawthorne v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980), the issue was held to be a reasonable basis to deny liability, and the insurer
was not cast for penalties.
176. LeBlanc v. Davis, 213 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Martin v. Starke,
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However, the dismissal must be without prejudice. The insured is en-
titled to refile his action after compliance with the policy
requirements.'"
Burden of Proof
The burden is on the plaintiff in an action on an insurance policy
to prove every fact essential to establish that his claim is within the
policy coverage.' One essential element of a UM claim is proof that
the negligent motorist was uninsured or underinsured. Failure to
establish lack of insurance is usually fatal to the claim,'79 although
occasionally the appellate courts mercifully remand for additional
proof.'80
This burden of proof is greatly alleviated by the provisions for
prima facie evidence in 22:1406(D)(6), which, when utilized, shift the
burden of proof to the insurer.
A tortfeasor's statement, allegedly made at the accident scene,
to the effect he was uninsured has been found insufficient to prove
uninsured status, 8 ' but testimony by the motorist in court to that
effect has been held to be adequate.' Once the existence of a policy
providing UM coverage is established, it is incumbent upon the in-
surer to establish the coverage limits. 8
Prescription
The supreme court, in Booth v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,"'
held that a claim under UM coverage is an action in contract which
208 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Pappas v. Aetna Cas. & Snr. Co., 191 So. 2d
658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
177. LeBlanc v. Travelers Indem. Co., 263 So. 2d 337 (La. 1972). This case was
a sequel to LeBlanc v. Davis, 213 So. 2d 185 (La. 1968), filed after the insured supplied
the requested medical information. The court held *that the insured was entitled to
maintain the action despite the contention of the insurer that it had been irrevocably
prejudiced by the deliberate violation of the policy.
178. Macaluso v. Watson, 188 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); see also Vitrano
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Roloff
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
179. Beck v. Allstate Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Talazac
v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Jordan v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Dalton v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 234 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Macaluso v. Watson, 188 So. 2d 178 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966).
180. Bullock v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 397 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
181. Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
182. Launey v. Thomas, 379 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
183. Williams v. Bernard, 413 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); see Gianakis v.
Mayen, 301 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
184. 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968).
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prescribes in ten years.' The court rejected the contention that the
tort prescription of one year18 should be applicable because of the
requirement that the uninsured motorist be "legally liable to the
insured." '187
Act 444 of 1977, which added Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5629,
effective July 1, 1978, established a two-year prescriptive period for
claims under UM coverage, which prescription commences to run on
the date of the accident. In Reichenphader v. Allstate Insurance Co.,89
the supreme court held that 9:5629 was applicable to existing claims.
The plaintiff was injured on September 13, 1975, and filed suit on
February 27, 1980. Finding the period between promulgation (August
8, 1977) and the effective date (July 1, 1978) to be reasonable as to
notice and opportunity to file suit, the court held that the plaintiffs
claim had prescribed on the effective date of Act 444 of 1977.
Suit against the tortfeasor interrupts prescription against the UM
insurer. In Hoefly v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 9° the
supreme court determined that the uninsured or underinsured motorist
and the UM carrier were solidary obligors, making applicable the rule
that suit against one debtor in solido interrupts prescription against
all.
9 1
Even though the two-year prescription is applicable to UM claims,
an action by the insurer against the negligent motorist seeking reim-
bursement for a claim paid under UM coverage has been held to be
purely delictual and subject to the prescription of one year."2 Also,
timely suit on a collision subrogation claim has been held not to in-
185. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3544.
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3536.
187. The court suggested legal liability meant only "fault" and the tortfeasor's "per-
sonal" right to claim extinguishment of the tort obligation through a prescription did
not inure to the benefit of the insurer. 253 La. at 529, 218 So. 2d at 583.
188. LA. R.S. 9:5629 (Supp. 1977): "Actions for recovery of damages sustained in motor
vehicle accidents brought pursuant to uninsured motorist provisions in motor vehicle
insurance policies are prescribed by two years reckoning from the date of the acci-
dent in which the damage was sustained."
189. 418 So. 2d 648 (La. 1982).
190. 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982); see also Matthews v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 418
So. 2d 582 (La. 1982) (decided on the same date as Hoefly). For a discussion of the
doctrine of "proportionate prescription" applied by the Matthews trial court, see Note,
Proportionate Prescription-An Alternative for Applying Changes in Liberative Prescrip-
tive Periods, 43 LA. L. REV. 777 (1983).
191. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097. Cf. Youngs v. Champagne, 348 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977) (the court held that a liability insurer of an alleged cotortfeasor may not
assert a third party demand for contribution against the UM insurer of the plaintiff).
192. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Larson, 317 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Veal, 280 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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terrupt prescription on a claim by the same insurer for reimburse-
ment of a UM claim paid after one year. 93
Penalties
Claims under UM coverage are first-party claims between an in-
sured and his own insurer which apparently are governed by the penal-
ty provisions of 22:658.1'" However, these claims are unique because
liability of the insurer is predicated upon the liability of a third par-
ty. Furthermore, fixing the amount of the claim is difficult because
of the uncertainty involved in measuring general damages for per-
sonal injuries. Most courts have refused to award penalties and at-
torney's fees for failure to pay uninsured motorist claims, either on
the ground that the insurer has no obligation to pay until the legal
liability of the alleged uninsured motorist is established19 or on the
ground that the insurer had reasonable cause to contest the claim.
1 9e
Penalties were awarded in Soniat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 97 under unusual circumstances; the insurer conceded
liability for the policy limits of its UM coverage, but it refused to
pay those limits unless and until the insured released a liability claim
against the driver of the insured vehicle. Because of the unique nature
of a UM claim, the penalty provision should be applied, if at all, only
in situations where the insurer has clearly engaged in outrageous
conduct to gain an economic advantage unrelated to the good faith
negotiation of the UM claim. Otherwise, the insurer should enjoy the
same rights as the tortfeasor to contest liability and damages.
Legal Interest
In Hebert v. Ordoyne,199 the first circuit concluded that legal in-
terest on a judgment awarding UM benefits runs from the date of
judicial demand. The court relied on Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:4203, which sets that commencement date for interest on "all
193. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brawner, 353 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). The
insurer sought to assert the UM subrogation claim by amendment of the original
petition.
194. This provision requires insurers to pay the amount of any claim within sixty
days. If a failure to pay timely is found to be "arbitrary, capricious and without prob-
able cause," the insurer is liable for a penalty of an additional twelve percent, plus
reasonable attorney's fees.
195. E.g., Schoelen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 318 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
Bubrig v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974.
196. E.g., Hawthorne v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980); McGrew v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1276 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
197. 340 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
198. 388 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
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judgments, sounding in damages, 'ex delicto.'"'I The third circuit
disagreed in Guidroz v. Tauzin,0 0 holding that interest was due only
from the date of judgment. That court reasoned that a UM claim was
a suit in contract" ' upon which interest was recoverable from the time
the debt became due. ' ' Guidroz further held that the debt under UM
coverage does not become due until there is a legal determination
of the liability of the uninsured motorist and the extent of the in-
sured's damages. Therefore, the third circuit awarded interest only
from the date of judgment. This conflict in the circuits remains.
Multiple Claimants and Inadequate UM Limits
Manieri v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Co. 2 involved the issue
of whether a UM insurer, faced with multiple claims in excess of its
policy limits, was required to prorate the coverage among its insureds.
The policy had $10,000 limits and covered bodily injury sustained in
an automobile accident by three insureds. Two of the insureds were
killed, and the plaintiff was injured. The insurer settled with the sur-
vivors of the deceased victims for $4,250 each and offered the remain-
ing $1,500 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that he was entitled
to a larger share of the policy limits. The fourth circuit correctly
questioned the applicability of decisions holding that a liability in-
surer has no duty to prorate the policy's limits among all victims. 4
The court expressed grave concern as to whether the UM insurer
should be able to favor one insured over another through settlement.
However, the court found in favor of the insurer on the ground that
199. The court also relied on O'Donnell v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 91
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), which contains a thorough review of the jurisprudence concern-
ing the recovery of interest under liability insurance policies. The third circuit, in
Guidroz v. Tauzin, 413 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), questioned the applicability
of O'Donnell to a UM claim.
200. 413 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
'201. The court derived this classification from Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968). See text at notes 184-193, supra (Prescription).
202. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 1938.
203. 350 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
204. Id Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 254 La. 429, 223 So. 2d
858 (1969) (and Holtzclaw v. Falco Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1978) (on rehearing)), the
supreme court held that the insurer may enter into reasonable and good faith set-
tlements to be credited against its policy limits, even though such settlements diminish
or exhaust the insurance available to other claimants. Noting that the policy express-
ly gives the insurer the right to settle, the court further recognized the jurispruden-
tial development of a duty on the part of the liability insurer to utilize the settlement
right in good faith and with reasonable care and skill for the protection of the in-
terests of both the insured and the insurer. The court correctly concluded that this
duty to protect its insured through settlement could not be reconciled with an addi-
tional duty to avoid preference among claimants.
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the settlements in fact achieved substantial proration of the policy
limits.
In Palombo v. Broussard,0 5 the third circuit applied the liability
standard that an insurer acting in good faith may make reasonable
settlements with some insureds even if this has the effect of reduc-
ing or exhausting coverage to the prejudice of other claimants.""
However, the court refused to give credit upon finding that the in-
surer had acted in bad faith.07
All insureds should share proportionately when uninsured motorist
limits are inadequate to fully compensate all insureds. However, such
claims seldom can be computed with mathematical precision since they
involve the difficult determination of damages for personal injury and
wrongful death. In addition, coverage is based upon the legal liability
of a third party, which may well be a contested issue as to one or
more insureds and may involve comparative negligence computations.
Perhaps, without deciding the issue, Manieri offers the best solution
by its suggestion that the insurer has a duty to consider the interest
of all of its insureds, but the insurer has the discretion to make a
reasonable distribution of the proceeds in an effort to achieve substan-
tial proration. Since the issues of coverage, liability, and damages can
be disputed and complicated, the insurer must be given wide discre-
tion to determine each insured's fair share in order to encourage volun-
tary resolution of multiple claims.
Res Judicata
The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Doyle v. State
Farm (Mutual) Insurance Co."' opens a wide door for relitigation of
205. 370 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
206. See note 204, supra.
207. Mr. and Mrs. Palombo were passengers in a Buick automobile owned and
operated by Mr. Lachaussee, whose wife was also a passenger. The Lachaussees own-
ed two automobiles, each insured under separate State Farm policies with $25,000
to $50,000 UM limits. Under Seaton v. Kelly, 339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976), and prior to
the anti-stacking provision, the Lachaussees could stack the coverages under the two
policies but the Palombos could not. Although the Palombos were more seriously in-
jured, the court found that the insurer had deliberately insisted on settlement with
the Lachaussees first for the purpose of decreasing the amount of coverage available
to the Palombos. In addition, the insurer had mislead the Lachaussees as to the coverage
available to them. The insurer settled with the Lachaussees for $35,000 and contend-
ed it only had $15,000 remaining for the Palombos. The court refused to give credit
for the "bad faith" settlement with the Lachaussees. Although the award is not clear-
ly itemized in the opinion, it appears that the Palombos may have been awarded an
amount in excess of the insurer's policy limits on the Buick. At most, the court should
have prorated the Buick limits, as the primary coverage, among the four claimants.
208. 414 So. 2d 763 (La. 1982).
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the extent of damages. The plaintiff was injured in an accident alleged-
ly caused by the joint fault of the operator and the manufacturer of
the other vehicle. He instituted suit in federal court against the
manufacturer, which in turn filed a third party demand against the
operator and her liability insurer. The plaintiff then filed suit in state
court against the manufacturer, the operator, her liability insurer, and
the plaintiff's own UM carrier. The state court suit was stayed pen-
ding the outcome of the federal litigation.
The plaintiff released the adverse driver and her liability insurer
upon payment of the policy limits of $10,000. The claim against the
manufacturer was then tried on the merits in federal court, and a
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$90,000. The judgment was satisfied, and no appeal was taken.
The plaintiff then renewed the state court action against the UM
carrier. A motion for summary judgment in favor of the UM carrier
was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeal. 09
With two dissents, the supreme court reversed, holding that judicial
estoppel does not apply in Louisiana and the requisite elements of
res judicata did not exist. Thus, there was no bar to the plaintiffs
relitigation of the extent of his damages with the UM carrier. A
dissenting justice suggested that the court should have the equitable
power to determine in a particular case that an already adjudicated
issue should not be relitigated.21 °
Under different facts, the third circuit refused to permit relitiga-
tion of the extent of damages. Ini Holley v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,
21 1
the plaintiffs brought suit against the driver of the other vehicle and
his liability insurer. The driver's liability policy had limits of $100,000.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the
total sum of $99,917.16. The judgment was satisfied. The plaintiffs
then filed a second suit against their own UM insurer. The court af-
firmed the dismissal of the second suit. Although the court recognized
that neither res judicata nor judicial estoppel was applicable, the
court held that the tortfeasor was not an underinsured motorist
209. Doyle v. State Farm Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
210. The majority indicated that the UM carrier could not be joined in the federal
court suit without defeating diversity jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
S 1332(c) (1976). However, this section provides only that a liability insurer sued in
a direct action is deemed to be a citizen of the state of its insured. Therefore, S 1332(c)
apparently would not preclude a UM claim if diversity of citizenship otherwise ex-
isted. State Farm happened to be the insurer of both the adverse vehicle and the
plaintiff's automobile. The release of the liability claim included the reservation of
the right to proceed against State Farm in its capacity as the UM carrier. The extent
to which this factor influenced the court is not apparent from the majority opinion.
211. 407 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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because the liability policy limits had not been exhausted. Whether
Holley survives Doyle is an unanswered question. However, relitiga-
tion of the extent of damages is an inefficient process, and the issue
needs to be rethought either judicially or legislatively.212
CONCLUSION
In its first twenty years, uninsured motorist coverage in Loui-
siana has developed dramatically. Some unresolved issues remain. For
the most part, however, this extremely important protection for
motorists has reached an equilibrium, legislatively and judicially, where
the vast majority of claims can be adjusted with certainty as to the
rights and responsibilities of the parties. Nevertheless there will always
be a substantial amount of litigation of UM claims. This is assured
because of the issues of liability and quantum of damages necessarily
involved in such claims, as well as the remaining coverage issues.
However, those involved in the handling of UM claims can look back
with nostalgic fascination at the first twenty years of UM coverage
in Louisiana, during which this unique insurance concept grew rapid-
ly from infancy to maturity.
212. The roles on the relitigation issue can be reversed. If the insured first pur-
sues his claim against the uninsured or underinsured motorist and obtains a judgment
which the UM insurer believes is excessive, the UM insurer certainly will contend
that it is not bound by the determination of damages in the suit in which it was not
given the opportunity to participate. Notions of'due process and specific policy language
protect the insurer in this situation. Unlike the reverse situation, however, the in-
surer would not be responsible for such piecemeal litigation. On the other hand, the
insured should be encouraged to litigate all of his liability and UM claims in the same
action.
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